



It is a commonly held view that auditory perception functions to tell us about 
sounds and their properties.  In this paper I argue that this common view is 
mistaken and that auditory perception functions to tell us about the objects that 
are the sources of sounds.  In doing so, I provide a general theory of auditory 
perception and use it to give an account of the content of auditory experience 
and of the nature of sounds. 
1. Introduction 
 
The common view of auditory perception marks a distinction between it and visual 
perception: whereas the function of vision is to decipher visible cues to enable us to 
see objects in the world, it is supposed that the function of hearing is to decipher 
acoustic cues to enable us to hear sounds, which are those objects of experience that 
can be characterised in terms of their sensory qualities of pitch, loudness, and timbre.  
Whereas research that studies vision emphasises the recovery of distal properties of 
objects – properties such as movement, shape, and size – research that studies audition 
emphasises the recovery of the sensory qualities of sounds.1 
According to this common view, then, the objects of auditory perception are 
sounds, and auditory perception functions to tell us about sounds and their properties.  
To the extent that we can perceive anything else about the world on the basis of 
hearing, it is because of a regular connection between sounds of certain kinds and the 
things that produce them.  We can hear ducks, for example, in virtue of hearing 
quacking sounds and knowing, explicitly or otherwise, of the connection between 
sounds of that kind and ducks.  It follows that an account of auditory perception 




1 In what follows I discuss only non-speech perception and the account I defend is intended to be an 
account of non-speech auditory perception.  The problems of speech perception are such that it may 
best be treated as a distinct sense modality. 
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should be an account of how we perceive sounds and their qualities, and such has 
been the approach of those who have written on the topic.2 
In this paper I reject this common view and argue that the function of auditory 
perception is, just like that of visual perception, to tell us about objects in our 
environment; to tell us, that is, about the objects and events around us that produce 
sounds rather than about the sounds they produce.  I develop the argument for this by 
considering what account we should give of a relatively well-known auditory illusion. 
In what follows I make the assumption that auditory experience, and 
perceptual experience generally, is intentional and can be characterised in terms of its 
representational content.  Nothing of substance will depend on this assumption, and 
the view I describe is consistent with other accounts of perceptual experience.  The 
common view of auditory perception is, in these terms, the view that auditory 
experience represents sounds and their properties; the view I shall argue for is the 
view that auditory experience represents the sources of the sounds it represents. 
2. The pipe‐organ illusion 
 
One of the better known auditory illusions is the pipe-organ illusion.  In the 18th 
century, pipe-organ manufacturers and players discovered that they could produce 
deep bass notes without the expense or space required for long bass pipes: if two notes 
of a fifth interval are played simultaneously, listeners hear a single note with a pitch 
an octave below that of the lower note of the dyad.  For example, pipes measuring 
four feet and two feet eight inches can together produce a sound like that produced by 
a single eight foot pipe.  The technique has been in use ever since.3   
Hearing a sound produced in this way is not a case of hearing two sounds 
simultaneously; the pitch that one hears as a result of the combination appears to be 
the pitch of a single sound: one seems to hear a single sound with that pitch.  This is 
not because we can never hear two (or more) sounds simultaneously.  In general, we 
can hear two different, harmonically unrelated, pitches as distinct even when we 




2 Of whom there are few.  See Casati and Dokic (1994) and O’Callaghan (2005); also O’Shaughnessy 
(1957a/b) and Pasnau (1999). 
3 For a more detailed history see organ historian Stephen Bicknell’s website 
http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~oneskull/3.6.01.htm. 
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cannot distinguish them by any other feature (such as their appearing to come from 
different locations or having different timbres).   
Although there is something misleading or illusory about the experience 
produced by the pipe-organ illusion, it is not clear what.  The illusion seems to show 
that it is possible for a single sound to be produced by two distinct and independent 
sources: two distinct sources produce a sound with a pitch distinct from that of the 
pitch of a sound that would be produced by either source alone.  If that’s right then 
two recent accounts of the nature of sounds must be mistaken.4  But is that right?  
Does the illusion really produce the experience of a sound or does it involve an 
experience of a merely apparent sound, a sound that is not really there?  Or does it 
perhaps involve an experience of a real sound as having a pitch it doesn’t really have?  
Or is it illusory in some other way?  It is, I think, far from clear both what we should 
say and why. 
To answer these questions we need to know something more about why the 
illusion occurs.  In general, perceptual illusions occur as a result of the way the 
perceptual system functions (and the way it can malfunction).  Understanding why an 
illusion occurs sheds light on that function.5  We can look to the function of a 
perceptual system in order to answer questions about what the experiences produced 
by that system represent, and so answer questions about the veridicality of particular 
experiences produced by it.  Understanding why the pipe-organ illusion occurs will 
tell us about the function of the auditory system.  If we know what the auditory 
system functions to represent then we will have grounds for deciding whether, in 
producing the illusion, it functions correctly and so produces a veridical experience, 
or incorrectly and so produces a non-veridical experience.  Or so, anyway, I shall 
argue. 
In the first half of this paper I give a characterisation, based on a variety of 
empirical data, of the function of auditory perception; in the second half I draw out 
the consequences of this characterisation.  The arguments in the second half are 
plausible only in the light of the characterisation of the function given in the first half.  




4 For example the views of Casati and Dokic (1994) and Pasnau (1999). 
5 An example that illustrates this is the investigation of visual surface representation in Nakayama et al 
(1995). 
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This way of proceeding is necessary because it is not possible to understand the nature 
of auditory perception or of sounds independently of understanding the function of 
auditory perception, and the function of auditory perception is not well understood.6  
Although the empirical data to which I appeal are relatively uncontroversial, my 
interpretation is not; my aim, therefore, has been to provide sufficient empirical detail 
for the reader to be in a position to assess the plausibility of my characterisation of the 
function of auditory perception.  A consequence of this is that the sections that follow 
are rather empirical; I ask the reader to bear with me until the second half when 




The common view of auditory perception tends to assume that the sounds we hear can 
be physically characterised as soundwaves having a certain frequency and amplitude, 
and that hearing sounds involves simply detecting the frequency and amplitude of 
these soundwaves.  This is almost entirely mistaken: it over-simplifies the nature of 
soundwaves and ignores the fact that they carry information about what produced 
them; consequently it both underestimates what perceptual processing the auditory 
system must do in order for us to hear sounds, and ignores the possibility that we 
might directly hear the sources of sounds and their properties.  
To understand why this assumption is mistaken, we need do little more than 
consider the way a string vibrates.  When a taut string is plucked it vibrates along its 
entire length with the maximum displacement occurring in the middle of the string.7  
The wavelength of this vibration is twice the length of the string; its frequency8 – the 




6 Unlike the function of visual perception, there is little agreement about what auditory perception 
functions to do – what it is for.  This is, I suspect, because research has focused on speech and music 
perception which, although important, are not what auditory perception is for (cats have an acute sense 
of hearing, but perceive neither speech nor music). 
7 Plucked strings behave slightly differently to strings caused to vibrate by other means.  For a detailed 
discussion see Fletcher and Rossing 1998, secs. 2.7 – 2.11. 
8 The frequency with which the string vibrates is inversely proportional to the wavelength, and 
proportional to the velocity of the wave.  The velocity of the wave depends on the tension of the string 
and its mass; changing the tension therefore changes the fundamental frequency of the vibration and 
the pitch of the sound produced. 
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lowest frequency component of the string’s complex vibration – is known as the 
fundamental frequency of the vibration.  The string also vibrates at three times the 
fundamental frequency, with a wavelength which corresponds to one and a half times 
the length of the string – imagine the string divided in three with each part vibrating – 
at five times the fundamental frequency – divide the string into five – and so on.  
These higher frequencies – the odd integer multiples of the fundamental frequency – 
are known as harmonics or partials of that fundamental.  The overall vibration of the 
string is both complex – the result of adding together or superimposing these different 
component vibrations9 – and changes over time as energy is lost and the vibration 
decays.  Different frequency components may decay at different rates so that the 
spectral composition of the vibration changes over time.  
Most of the sounds we hear are produced by events involving the interaction 
of objects rather than by vibrating strings.  We hear sounds produced by things 
tapping, knocking, banging, rubbing and scraping against one another.   In much the 
same way that a string vibrates when it is plucked, an object, when struck, vibrates in 
a complex way that comprises many different frequency components.   
When an object is stuck the force of the impact deforms it; once the force is 
removed, the object vibrates until the energy of the deformation is lost and the object 
returns to its equilibrium state.  The character of an object’s vibration – the number 
and proportion of different frequency components and the way they change over time 
– is determined by its physical properties.  The size of an object will determine the 
lowest frequency at which it vibrates.  A solid object, unlike a string, vibrates along 
several dimensions, and its shape and size will determine both the frequency and 
spectral composition of its vibration.  The time it takes for the object to return to 
equilibrium is determined by how the vibration is damped – that is, how quickly it 
loses energy. Heavily damped vibrations decay rapidly, whereas lightly damped 




9 Two sine waves can be combined to produce a complex waveform which is simply the result of 
summing the amplitudes of the two waves at each moment of time.  Complex waveforms can be 
combined in the same way.  Conversely, any complex waveform can be analysed into a number of 
component sine waves of various frequencies and amplitudes which, when added together in the 
correct phase, produce the analysed wave (this process of analysis is known as Fourier analysis).  The 
complex sound wave that is detected by our ears is equivalent to a set of phase related sine wave 
components of differing frequency and amplitude.  Many psychoacoustic theories suppose that the 
auditory system must perform some equivalent of a Fourier analysis. 
 6
vibrations are prolonged.  Damping may vary with frequency so that different 
frequency components decay at different rates; the kind and amount of damping 
therefore affects the way the vibration varies over time; in particular, it affects the 
spectral composition of the vibration over time and not just its average amplitude.10  
All these features of an object contribute to the pattern of frequency components of 
the vibration and to the way that pattern changes over time.  The kind of interaction 
between objects that causes the vibration also affects the character of that vibration.  
Whether the object was struck once or continuously, whether it was scraped, and so 
on, affects the time-course of the subsequent vibration.  The force with which an 
object is struck affects the spectral composition as well as the amplitude of the 
resulting vibration; typically, the relative intensity of the higher frequency harmonics 
of a vibration increases when an object is struck with greater force.11  The character of 
the vibration produced by an object’s interactions with other objects is, therefore, 
partly determined by its physical attributes and by the nature of its interactions.  
Because of this, the vibration embodies or carries information about the object’s 
physical attributes; information concerning, for example, the size or mass of the 
object, the kind of material of which it is composed, its density; and it carries 
information about the object’s interaction with other objects, about the force with 
which it was struck, the number of times it was struck, and whether the blow was 
clean.12 
When the object is immersed in a suitable medium, its vibration produces a 
compression wave in that medium.  The compression wave produced by a vibrating 
object interacts with other objects in the environment, is filtered by passing through 
the medium, and is differentially reflected by surrounding surfaces; this alters the 
spectral composition of the wave in determinate ways.  The compression waves that 




10 How much damping different materials produce very clearly affects the character of the sound an 
object makes when it is struck – for example, wood, which is heavily damped, makes a thunking sound, 
whereas metal, which is less damped, rings.  
11 See Chowning 1999, p.270. 
12 Although for the sake of simplicity I have described how differences in geometrical properties of 
objects affect the way that they vibrate, they do so only in virtue of being correlated with the 
mechanical properties of those objects; it is likely that the auditory system detects or tracks mechanical 
rather than geometrical properties of objects.  Further work needs to be done to discover which 
mechanical properties the auditory system detects or tracks.  See Carello et al (2005, pp.14 ff). 
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reach the ears therefore carry information about the physical space or environment 
within which the events that produced the wave occur. 
In virtue of having been produced by objects, and structured by interactions 
with their surroundings, the soundwaves that reach us embody a great deal of 
information about object-involving events occurring in our environment, about the 
number and properties of these objects, and about the environment in which these 
events occur.  In picturing auditory perception as the perception of sounds, the fact 
that soundwaves embody this information is either overlooked or ignored.  The 
information is, at least in principle, detectable, and although little systematic research 
has been done, it is evident that our auditory system can detect it: it is evident, that is, 
that we can hear the sources of sounds and their properties. 
4. We can perceive sources 
 
Imagine that you are woken up in the middle of the night by a strange sound.  As you 
lie there, listening, you can attend to your experience in two ways: you might attend to 
the sound itself, focussing on its attributes – its pitch, timbre, and loudness – it is more 
likely, though, that you will attend to what is making the sound: to the fact that it is 
the sound of a window breaking, that it came from the kitchen, and that now you can 
hear the sash being opened.   
When people are asked to describe what they hear (in psychoacoustics 
experiments, for example) they are often encouraged to attend to their experience in 
the first way: to describe the sensory attributes of the sounds they hear in abstraction 
from whatever it was that produced the sound.13  They may be helped by being played 
harmonically simple sounds produced by a tone generator, sounds which develop little 
over time and which have little or no ecological significance.  There is little to 
describe about such an experience over and above the sensory qualities of the sounds.  
The majority of the sounds we hear are not like that, and most everyday listening is of 
the second kind: we attend to the apparent sources of the sounds we hear and listen to 
the things going on around us, to the objects and events that produced the sounds.  In 




13 When they do this, listeners adopt what Gaver (1993a) calls a ‘musical’ and Scruton (1987, pp.2 ff.) 
an ‘acousmatic’ attitude to what they hear. 
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most everyday listening we are concerned with properties and attributes of the sound 
producing events and the environment in which they occur, rather than with properties 
of the sound itself.   
There is evidence that when we attend in this way we can perceive sound 
producing events and objects and their properties, and are capable of recognising very 
specific characteristics of the events and objects we hear.14  We are, for example, very 
good at recognising what kind of object or event produced a sound.  Listeners who 
were played recordings of different size jars and bottles falling to the ground and 
either bouncing or breaking and were asked which kind of event – a bouncing or a 
breaking – they heard were almost always correct.15  When asked to identify thirty 
common natural sounds in a free identification task – sounds such as those produced 
by clapping, tearing paper, and footsteps – listeners recognised source events very 
reliably; they described the sounds in terms of the objects and events which caused 
them, and only described the sensory qualities of sounds whose source events they 
could not recognise.16  In a similar experiment in which seventeen sounds were 
played, listeners were asked to identify what they heard.  They nearly always 
described the sounds in terms of their sources, and were surprisingly accurate.  
Several participants could readily distinguish the sounds made by someone running 
upstairs from those of someone running downstairs; others were correct about the size 
of objects dropped into water; and most could tell from the sound of pouring liquid 
that a cup was being filled.  Some sounds – such as the sound of a file drawer being 
opened and closed – were difficult to identify, but the listeners’ descriptions revealed 
what might be regarded as basic attributes of what was heard: “several people said the 
file drawer sounded like a bowling alley, both of which might be described as ‘rolling 
followed by impact(s)’”.17 




14 For a recent survey of much of this evidence, see Carello et al. (2005).  Compare what I say here to 
accounts of visual object recognition, which has been studied in great detail and is widely understood 
to be a perceptual phenomenon with the results of the process of object recognition entering into the 
content of visual experience.  I know of few studies of auditory object recognition, but see McAdams 
(1993) and Peretz (1993). 
15 Listeners’ success rate was 99%; see Warren and Verbrugge, 1984. 
16 The success rate was about 95%; see VanDerveer, 1979. 
17 Gaver, 1993a, p.12.  It is plausible to suppose that recognising such events involves the perception of 
simpler, more fundamental, properties of events and that such properties may be perceived even when 
the event is not recognised.  In much the same way visual recognition of an object as, for example, a 
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As well as recognising the sources of sounds we can perceive their properties.  
We are, for example, able to perceive the trajectory of an approaching sound source,18 
and the time to contact – that is, the time at which we will collide – with a sound 
source that is moving towards us.19  We are good at hearing whether an invisible 
object making a noise is within reach;20 and we are able to hear just as well as we can 
see whether a gap between a sound source and a vertical surface is wide enough to 
pass through.21  We can identify the material composition of an object from the sound 
of an impact,22 and perceive the force of the impact.23  More surprisingly, perhaps, we 
are able to distinguish geometrical properties of objects.  When differently shaped – 
circular, square, and triangular – flat steel plates of the same mass and surface area 
were suspended and struck by a steel pendulum released from a fixed location, 
listeners sitting behind a screen were able to classify the shapes at a level well above 
chance.  A similar experiment was conducted with rectangular steel plates of different 
proportions and dimensions chosen so that all were equal in mass and surface area.  
Listeners had to respond by adjusting lines to provide a visual match for the height 
and width of the plate.  Although they were given no other information about the size 
of the object, the actual linear dimensions of the plates accounted for 98% of the 
variance in the listeners’ responses.24  Similarly, when listeners were asked to indicate 
the lengths of cylindrical rods dropped to the floor, the actual length of the rods 
accounted for 95% of the variance in perceived length.25 
What these examples suggest is that our auditory system is able to extract the 
information about objects embodied in sound waves.  The resulting experience 
represents properties of the sources of sounds as well as sounds produced by those 




television, involves perceiving the object as having more fundamental properties such as size and shape 
which it may be perceived as having even when it is not recognised as a television. 
18 Neuhoff, 2004. 
19 Schiff and Oldak, 1990. 
20 Carello et al., 1998. 
21 Russell and Turvey, 1999. 
22 Wildes and Richards, 1988. 
23 Freed, 1990. 
24 The plates were a square (482mm), a medium rectangle (381mm x 610mm), and a long rectangle 
(254mm x 914mm), the width indicator ranged from 0 to 2.5m, and the height indicator from 0 to 1.5m. 
Although listeners’ relative scaling of the plates was accurate, the perceived dimensions were 
underestimates of actual dimensions, ranging from 252mm to 445mm for an actual range of 254mm to 
914mm  (Kunkler-Peck and Turvey 2000).   
25 Carello, et al., 1998. 
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sources.  It is in virtue of our experience representing properties of the sources of 
sounds we are able to recognise and discriminate those sources in the way I have 
described.  The examples suggest that our auditory experience can represent sounds as 
produced by things of a certain size, by something rolling, by an object striking a 
surface, or even by hands clapping;  that we may experience a sound as made up of a 
number of simpler sounds and hear the sequences as having been produced by 
footsteps, or breaking glass; and, although these particular examples are silent on the 
issue, there are other examples which show that we can perceive aspects of the 
environment in which the sound was produced – that we can experience a sound as 
being produced by an object striking a surface in an enclosed space, for example.   
So far I have argued that soundwaves carry information about the things that 
produced them and that, in virtue of this, we can perceive those things – that our 
auditory system produces experiences that represent the sources of sounds and their 
properties.  In the following sections I will describe the connection between these 
facts and our experience of sounds. 
5. The problem of source perception 
 
If the sounds we heard were only ever produced by one event at a time, and if the 
transmission of soundwaves through a medium were more robust, the fact that a 
soundwave is made up of many frequency components would be unproblematic: 
components that are detected simultaneously would have been simultaneously 
produced by a single event, and successively detected components would have been 
produced by temporally successive parts of that event.  There may be, however, and 
often are, many different events producing sounds simultaneously.  Compression 
waves produced by these different events interact with each other, with surrounding 
objects, and with the medium, so that the compression wave that reaches and is 
detected by the ears is, at any moment, the result of the additive combination of the 
compression waves produced by all the sound producing events occurring in our 
immediate environment; as a result this compression wave is composed of many 
different frequency components produced by different events.  Not only are the 
frequency components detected by the ear at any moment the product of different 
sound producing events, those from a single event, as well as travelling directly, may 
reach the ears indirectly after having been reflected from other surrounding objects 
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and surfaces, or being otherwise distorted.  The fact that frequency components are 
detected simultaneously is therefore no indication that they were produced 
simultaneously by a single event.  And the fact that frequency components are 
detected successively may indicate that they have been produced by temporally 
successive parts of a single event, by two distinct but consecutive events, or be the 
result of a component produced by a single event being detected twice having reached 
the ear directly and then later indirectly after having been reflected from a nearby 
object or surface.  Furthermore, the frequency components produced by different 
events, or reflected components produced by a single event, may constructively or 
destructively interfere with, obscure or mask one another.   
The auditory system can detect only the patterns of frequency components that 
make up the complex vibrations of the soundwaves that reach the ears.  It must 
construct a representation of the environment by extracting the information that this 
pattern embodies.  Auditory perception must, therefore, involve perceptual processing 
much like that involved in visual perception.  We can think of the frequency 
components detected by the ears as analogous to the pattern of light detected by the 
retinas of the eyes.  Just as we see things in virtue of detecting a pattern of light of a 
surface (the retina), so we hear things in virtue of detecting properties of soundwaves 
disturbing a surface (the basilar membrane).   
We don’t, of course, see the pattern of light: our visual experience is the result 
of perceptual processes to which the pattern of light detected by the retina is one of 
the inputs.  Similarly, we don’t hear the frequency components of soundwaves 
detected by the ears; our auditory experience, including the sounds we hear, is a result 
of perceptual processes, to which the frequency components of soundwaves are one of 
the inputs.  This auditory process in part (though only in part)26 involves a grouping or 
organising of frequency components in such a way as to produce the experience we 
have of sounds.  Grouping detected frequency components in such a way as to extract 
information about the environment is a far from trivial task.  Its difficulty is illustrated 




26 The particular grouping processes that I describe in this paper are only a small part of the process or 
processes that produce our auditory experience.  Such grouping explains why we hear the sounds we 
hear, but doesn’t explain how information about the sources of sounds is extracted.  Furthermore, the 
grouping processes that I discuss are only a subset of those that occur: other processes are responsible 
for grouping over time, grouping according to schemata, and so on. 
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by Albert Bregman’s imaginary game: suppose that you are standing by a lake on 
which there are boats: 
 
The game is this.  Your friend digs two narrow channels up from the side of 
the lake.  Each is a few feet long and a few inches wide and they are spaced a 
few feet apart.  Halfway up each one, your friend stretches a handkerchief and 
fastens it to the side of the channel.  As waves reach the side of the lake they 
travel up the channels and cause the two handkerchiefs to go into motion.  You 
are allowed to look only at the handkerchiefs and from their motions to answer 
a series of questions: How many boats are there on the lake and where are 
they?  Which is the most powerful one?  Which is the closer?  Is the wind 
blowing?  Has any large object been dropped suddenly into the lake? 
Solving this problem seems impossible, but it is a strict analogy to the 
problem faced by our auditory systems.  The lake represents the lake of air that 
surrounds us.  The two channels are our two ear canals, and the handkerchiefs 
are our ear drums.  The only information that the auditory system has available 
to it, or ever will have, is the vibrations of these two ear drums.  Yet it seems 
able to answer questions very like the ones that were asked by the side of the 
lake: How many people are talking? Which one is louder, or closer? Is there a 
machine humming in the background (Bregman 1990, pp. 5-6). 
 
Answering these questions about events occurring in the environment requires that 
frequency components detected by the ears be grouped in such a way that those 
produced by a single source are treated together and distinguished from those 
produced by distinct sources.  This grouping is necessary in order for our perceptual 
system to extract information about the sources of sounds and so produce auditory 
experiences that represent those sources.  How is such grouping achieved? 
6. How is grouping achieved? 
 
Considered in isolation, a single frequency component carries very little information 
about its source.  There is nothing intrinsic to a particular frequency component that 
marks it as having been produced by one event rather than another, and nothing 
intrinsic to each of a set of components that marks it as having been produced by a 
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single event simultaneously with other components.27  How then does the auditory 
system group frequency components?28  Part of the explanation depends on the fact 
that there will be relationships between sets of components that have been produced 
by the same event that are unlikely to exist by chance.  These relationships obtain in 
virtue of the physical properties of the different frequency components – properties 
such as the timing, frequency, and amplitude of the waveform – and in virtue of the 
differential effects different components have on the two ears.  
I have described (in section 3) how an object’s vibration involves frequency 
components that are harmonics of a fundamental frequency.  A consequence of this is 
that the frequency components of a soundwave produced by a single object will be 
harmonically related.  These harmonic relationships are unlikely to exist between 
frequency components produced by distinct objects, since it is unlikely that two 
simultaneously occurring natural events produce overlapping sets of harmonics.  This 
means that if the auditory system detects a number of frequency components that are 
harmonically related they are likely to have been produced by the same source event.  
Similarly, the soundwave produced when an object is struck will have frequency 
components which share temporal properties: all the components will begin at the 
same moment in time.  If the auditory system detects a number of frequency 
components which have the same temporal onset then it is likely that those 
components have all been produced by the same source event.  Components produced 
by such an event are likely to be in phase with one another, those produced by distinct 
events unlikely to be so; if components are detected that are in phase with one another 
they are likely to have been produced by the same source event.  The frequency of 
components produced by an event may change or modulate over time.  The 
frequencies of all the components produced by a single event will tend to change in 
the same way, but it is very unlikely that components produced by distinct events will 
share a pattern of frequency modulation.  Therefore, if a set of components is detected 
that have a common pattern of frequency modulation then they are likely to have been 




27 Compare this to the question: How does the auditory system know which sequences of frequency 
components have been produced by the same event?  The answers to both questions are not entirely 
independent, but for the sake of brevity I am omitting any discussion of sequential integration. 
28 Relatively little is known about the details of how this integration is achieved.  This is especially true 
for naturally produced sounds (glass breaking, water flowing, etc).  In what follows I sketch some of 
the principles involved. 
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produced by the same source event.  A soundwave produced by one object scraping 
against another will have frequency components whose amplitudes vary 
simultaneously over time in a way that those produced by distinct events will not; if 
the auditory system detects components with a common pattern of amplitude 
modulation then they are likely to have been produced by the same source event.  And 
so on. 
These are all examples of relationships that are only likely to exist between 
components produced by a single event and are unlikely to exist otherwise.  In 
grouping or organising frequency components, the auditory system is able to detect 
and exploit these relationships: when frequency components are detected that bear 
these relationships to each other they tend to be grouped together and treated by the 
auditory system as having been produced a single source event.29 
This brief list of relationships is not intended to be exhaustive; there are others 
that the auditory system can exploit.  In particular there are relationships that exist 
between components over time which are involved in their sequential organisation – 
in grouping together a component at one time with a component at a later time – and 
there are relationships that can be exploited by top-down processes – by processes that 
draw on knowledge of the properties of object or event that produced the sound.  Such 
top-down processes are likely to be involved in the perception of any temporally 
structured event, including speech perception, and in the perception of familiar 
‘meaningful’ sounds, such as the sound of a dog’s bark, of footsteps, of a car’s engine, 
and so on.30 
What all these examples of how frequency components are grouped show, 
both those that involve simultaneous grouping and those that involve sequential 
grouping, is the following: that we cannot explain why the auditory system groups 
frequency components in the way it does except in terms of a process whose function 




29 As I am using it, the term ‘grouped’ is the name of a process rather than the product of a process.  
That the auditory system tends to group components that share these features has been experimentally 
demonstrated.  My discussion here draws on Bregman (1990), especially ch.3, to which the reader 
should refer for details of the empirical support for the claims in the text. 
30 The relationships I have described are all involved in what Bregman calls ‘primitive stream 
segregation’ (1990, pp.38 ff.); this is a process that is likely to be innate and which exploits invariable 
properties of the subject’s environment. It contrasts with what he calls ‘schema-based segregation’ 
(1990, pp. 395 ff., and pp.665 ff.) which is learned. 
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is to group together all and only those components that have been produced by the 
same source event.  Considered independently of their sources, the way the auditory 
system groups frequency components is arbitrary.  It is only relative to their sources 
that grouping makes sense. 
Why does the auditory system function to group together all and only those 
components that have been produced by the same source event?  I have described how 
soundwaves, in virtue of having been caused and systematically structured by events 
occurring in our environment and by the environment itself, carry information about 
those source events and the environment.  Extracting this information requires the 
auditory system to determine the number of sources that are producing the 
components it detects; this in turn requires the auditory system to group components 
according to whether they have been produced by the same source event.  Since 
information about the event is carried in the pattern or structure of frequency 
components it produces, the auditory system must group just those components 
produced by that event in order to recover the information.  Grouping is, therefore, a 
necessary step in a process that extracts information about the sources of sounds; it is 
a necessary part of a perceptual process which functions to produce experiences that 
represent the sources of sounds. 
Although grouping components from the same source is necessary for the 
auditory system to perform the function of representing the sources of sounds, it’s not 
otherwise necessary.  We can imagine an auditory system – that is, a system that 
detects the frequency components of soundwaves – that functioned to represent, say, 
acoustic spectra (to produce a spectrograph of what it detects) or that functioned 
simply to group frequency components in an aesthetically pleasing way.  Although it 
is difficult to imagine circumstances in which such perceptual systems would be 
useful to a creature, they are not conceptually incoherent. 
7. Grouping and our experience of sounds 
 
What is the connection between auditory grouping and the sounds we experience?  In 
talking of grouping of frequency components by the auditory system I am describing a 
functional process; in talking of a set of components as having been grouped I mean 
that they are treated by subsequent auditory processing as belonging to a group.  Our 
auditory experience is representational and sounds are the objects of representational 
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states.  What sounds our experience represents and how it represents them to be is 
determined by how the auditory system groups the frequency components it detects.  
In particular, the representational content of our experience is determined in such a 
way that we experience a sound corresponding to each grouping of frequency 
components.  If all the frequency components detected by the auditory system are 
grouped together then we have an experience as of a single sound whose character is 
partly determined by the components that have been grouped in producing our 
experience of it; if those same components were grouped into two, we would have an 
experience as of two sounds.  The evidence for this is empirical.  By manipulating the 
properties of frequency components we can change the way they are grouped and so 
change the number and character of the sounds a listener experiences.31 
For example, if played a pure tone – in effect a single frequency component – 
a listener will have an experience as of a single sound.  If, after a short interval, a 
second tone at a different frequency is added to the first, a listener will typically hear 
one of two things.  If the second tone is at a frequency unrelated to the first, then she 
will have an experience as of a distinct sound; that is, her experience will be as of two 
sounds.  This happens because the auditory system has grouped the two frequency 
components separately.  If the second tone is at a frequency related to the first by 
being, say, its first harmonic, then the subject is unlikely to experience it as a distinct 
sound; she may, rather, experience a slight change in the character of the initial sound.  
This happens because the auditory system treats both components as having been 
produced by a single source and so groups them together.  The same thing happens if 
a third tone is added; and so on.  As consequence of their being grouped together such 
a set of frequency components produces an experience as of a single sound.  If, 
however, small random frequency variations are added to subsets of the components, 
a listener will typically have an experience of distinct and countable sounds.  Such 
frequency variations are sufficient to prevent the components being grouped by the 




31 Many of the same principles apply to grouping in music, and Diana Deutsch (1999) describes several 
examples of how changes in grouping change what musical sounds, and what sequences of musical 
sounds, are heard.  It is an interesting question whether our experience of the longer sequences of tones 
in a melody can be explained in terms of mechanisms that evolved for the perception of ecological 
(non-musical) events. 
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auditory system as having been produced by a single source.32  A particularly striking 
example of this phenomenon is provided by the sound made by striking a bell.33  
Normally, listeners experience this as a single sound.  When different random 
variations in frequency are added to three different sets of harmonics of the 
soundwave, the sound appears to split into three.  When these random variations are 
removed, the three sounds appear to merge back into a single sound.  In this example, 
artificially altering the soundwave changes the way the auditory system groups 
different frequency components and, as a consequence, changes the number and 
character of the sounds a listener experiences. 
Given that the auditory system functions to group together all and only those 
frequency components that have been produced by the same event, and that what 
sounds our experience represents is determined by how the auditory system groups 
frequency components – so that a represented sound corresponds to a grouping of 
frequency components – it follows that the auditory system functions in such as way 
as to produce experiences that represent sounds which correspond to the events which 
produced them; which correspond, that is, to their sources.  We cannot, therefore, 
explain why we experience the sounds we do except in terms of a process which 
functions to produce experiences of sounds that correspond to the events which 
produced them.  That is, we cannot explain our experience of sounds except in terms 
of their sources. 
This reverses the order of explanation implicit in the common view of auditory 
perception that I began by describing.  According to the common view, it is because 
we perceive the sounds we do that we can come to know anything about the sources 
of sounds: we hear a sound and recognise it to have been produced by a certain kind 
of source.  We explain our experience or perception of the sources of sounds in terms 
of our perception of sounds.  But such an explanation would only be possible if were 
possible to explain why we experience the sounds we do without reference to a 
process that functions to enable us to perceive their sources.  No such explanation is 
possible.  We perceive sounds because we perceive the sources of sounds. 




32 Chowning, 1999, pp. 265 ff. 
33 An example recording is available at ****. 
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I began by characterising the common view of auditory perception according 
to which auditory perception functions to tell us about sounds and their properties; to 
the extent we can perceive anything else about the world on the basis of hearing it is 
because of a regular connection between sounds of certain kinds and the things that 
produce them. 
In the first half of this paper I have drawn on a range of empirical data to argue 
that the function of auditory perception is to tell us about objects in our environment, 
rather than about sounds.  This conclusion follows from the fact that we can only 
explain why we experience the sounds we do in terms of the part they play in the 
process which carries out the function of telling us about objects.  Our experience of 
sounds, rather than being the goal of that function, is the result of the operation of a 
process that implements the function.  The sounds we experience are determined by 
an intermediate stage in this process.  Although the auditory system functions to tell 
us about sounds in the sense that it tells us about sounds as part of its functioning, 
telling us about sounds is not its function.  Telling us about sounds is not the goal of 
audition: its goal is to tell us about objects. 
This conclusion is important and I have drawn on three kinds of empirical 
evidence to reach it.  Firstly, evidence about the connection between the physical and 
other properties of objects and the way they vibrate; secondly, evidence that the 
auditory system can extract information about the sources of sounds from vibrations 
transmitted by soundwaves; thirdly, evidence about the operation of the process that 
extracts this information.34  Although based on empirical evidence, my 
characterisation of the function of auditory perception is an interpretation of that 
evidence;35 and it has various philosophical consequences, not least for what we 
should say about the content of auditory experience and about the nature of sounds.  I 




34 The significance of this evidence for accounts of auditory perception is not always appreciated by 
those doing empirical work in audition.  They tend to study one of these areas in isolation from the 
others.  But surely it would be fruitful for those working on the perception of music, for example, to 
relate the properties of sounds that are said to determine grouping in music to the processes for object 
perception that I have been sketching.  It is more plausible to suppose that perception of music emerges 
from a general capacity for auditory object perception (of the kind I have described) than to think we 
have evolved an independent capacity for the perception of music. 
35 My interpretation is, as far as I know, novel. 
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explore some of these consequences in the second half of this paper.  Before doing 




The existence of various relationships between the frequency components detected by 
the ears, some of which I described in section 6, makes it probable that those 
components have been produced by the same source event. We can, therefore, view 
these relationships as constituting evidence that the components have been produced 
by a single event, evidence that the auditory system uses in determining how to group 
components together and whether to treat them as having been produced by a single 
source. 
In ideal circumstances this evidence will be unequivocal and will indicate a 
single way of grouping detected components.  In less than ideal circumstances, the 
evidence may be more equivocal.36  Soundwaves suffer interference during 
transmission, and individual frequency components may become obliterated or 
distorted; in noisy environments some components may be masked by others; damage 
or deterioration to the ears may mean that some components are not detected.  In such 
circumstances the evidence may not mandate a single way of grouping detected 
frequency components; some evidence may favour one way of grouping and other 
evidence a different way of grouping.  When this happens, the auditory system may 
disregard some evidence to make the best sense it can of components it detects; we 
can think of the sources represented by the resultant experience as providing the best 
– or most likely – explanation of the pattern of detected frequency components.  
Making best sense of the evidence will normally result in a correct way of grouping, 




36 With the advent of recorded and electronically produced sounds, non-ideal circumstances (from the 
point of view of the function of the auditory system) have become common.  Soundwaves and 
frequency components that are never likely to occur naturally and that will not have occurred during 
the evolutionary history of the auditory system are now commonplace.  Sounds played over stereo 
loudspeakers are a good example: soundwaves produced by two sources have relationships that are 
practically impossible in nature and as a consequence, although they are produced by two sources, the 
auditory system ignores or disregards their spatial discrepancies and treats them as having a single (and 
merely apparent) source. 
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producing an experience both of sounds that corresponds to their sources, and that 
veridically represents those sources.37  Sometimes, however, the grouping is incorrect 
and results in an experience of sounds that do not correspond to events which 
produced them. 
In non-ideal circumstances, then, the auditory system may group frequency 
components incorrectly; that is, components produced by different sources may be 
grouped together; those produced by a single source distinguished into distinct 
groups; or components from one source grouped with those from another.  Such 
groupings are incorrect relative to the auditory system’s function of grouping all and 
only frequency components produced by the same source.  This incorrect grouping 
produces an experience of sounds that do not correspond to events which produced 
them.   
The experience produced by the pipe-organ illusion is the result of this kind of 
incorrect grouping.  The auditory system has evidence that suggests that the frequency 
components produced by the two pipes have a single source: air in the two organ 
pipes vibrates at frequencies that are harmonically related producing a soundwave 
with harmonically related frequency components; the two pipes are played 
simultaneously to produce frequency components with synchronous onsets; and the 
pipes are made from the same material so produce frequency components which are 
likely to be micro-modulated in similar ways.  It is very unlikely that distinct naturally 
occurring events would produce soundwaves with frequency components that are 
related in this way.  The auditory system therefore treats these frequency components 
– that have in fact been produced by two distinct events – as having been produced by 
a single event, disregarding any evidence – concerning, say, the locations of the 
sources – that may conflict with that interpretation.  This produces an experience that 
represents a sound as having been produced by single source event, which is the best 
– most likely – explanation of the frequency components detected. 
That, however, cannot be the whole story.  The incorrect grouping of 
frequency components explains why the pipe-organ illusion produces an experience 
of a single sound; it doesn’t explain why that sound is experienced as having a pitch 




37 Often in the evolutionary history of the auditory; it may no longer be true. 
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which is different to the pitch of the sound that would be produced by either pipe 
playing alone.  That can only be explained by appealling both to how the auditory 
system makes best sense of the evidence it detects, together with an account of pitch 
perception. 
The auditory system tends to group harmonically related frequency 
components because they are unlikely to exist other than as having been produced by 
a single event.  Suppose, however, that only a partial set of harmonics is detected – a 
set of higher harmonics, for instance, but no fundamental frequency.  There are two 
possible explanations of the existence of such a set.  The first is that two or more 
distinct sources are vibrating at frequencies with fundamentals identical to the first, 
second, and higher detected harmonics respectively.  Such circumstances are very 
unlikely to occur naturally though it is, of course, exactly what happens to produce the 
pipe-organ illusion. The second, and far more likely, explanation of the detection of 
just the higher harmonics is that the fundamental component produced by single 
source was not detected because it was masked, had been filtered out of the 
soundwave, or otherwise obscured.  Because this second explanation is more likely, 
the auditory system treats a partial set of harmonics in the same way as the same 
harmonics would be treated were the fundamental to be simultaneously detected. This 
is true even if only some of the higher harmonics are detected. 
Again, this makes sense given that the auditory system functions in the way 
that I have described.  The auditory system groups components as part of a process 
whose function is to extract information about the source of the sound, and so produce 
experiences that represent the source. Harmonics embody information about the 
number of sources – two or more different sources would be required to produce sets 
of harmonics with different fundamental frequencies – and – because the frequency of 
the fundamental of a set of harmonics is determined by the physical properties of the 
object, in particular its size – information about properties of the source.  By in effect 
ignoring the fact that the fundamental is missing, the auditory system both groups the 
detected components in a way that normally corresponds a source, and recovers the 
information about the properties of the source which the harmonic structure of that 
grouping embodies.  Grouping in this way will, in normal circumstances, produce a 
veridical experience of the source of the sound. 
How is this connected to the pitch a sound is experienced as having?  Pitch is 
the auditory feature of sounds in virtue of which they can be ordered on a scale from 
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high to low.  Many, though not all, sounds are experienced as having a pitch.  Sounds 
produced by simple vibrations, producing soundwaves with a single frequency 
component, are experienced as having a pitch determined by the frequency of that 
component.  Most of the sounds we hear are produced by complex vibrations made up 
of many different frequency components.  We nonetheless experience many such 
sounds as having a pitch.  For example, we normally experience the sound produced 
by a plucked string as having a particular pitch.  Since there is no single frequency 
which is the frequency of the string’s vibration, the pitch we hear the sound to have is 
not simply determined by, or identical with, the frequency of the vibration that caused 
our experience of it.  
When the auditory system groups a set of simultaneously detected harmonics 
to produce an experience of a single sound, the pitch such a sound is experienced to 
have is determined by the fundamental frequency of the grouped harmonic 
components.38  For example, a soundwave with frequency components at 200Hz, 
400Hz, 600Hz, and 800Hz normally produces an experience of a sound having the 
same pitch as a sound produced by a soundwave with a single 200Hz component.  
Since, even when the fundamental frequency of a set of components is absent, the 
auditory system will tend to group the harmonics and treat them in the same way as a 
set with the fundamental present, a set of harmonics with a missing fundamental 
produce an experience of a sound with a pitch the same as that of the sound produced 
when the fundamental frequency is present.  For example, a soundwave with 
frequency components at 400Hz, 600Hz, and 800Hz normally produces an experience 
of a sound having the same pitch as the experience of a sound produced by a 
soundwave with a single 200Hz component.  This explains why when we musical 
instruments over the telephone or on a small radio – neither of which is able to 
reproduce low frequencies – we hear them as having their normal pitch.39 




38 Bregman calls this the ‘harmonicity principle’ (1990, pp. 232 ff). 
39 Whilst it has been long known that the perceived pitch of a sound is determined by its harmonic 
structure, in particular by its (perhaps missing) fundamental frequency, there is still no widely accepted 
explanation of how the auditory system does this.  Most textbooks on psychoacoustics contain a 
description of what are taken to be the most plausible theories (but see the next footnote).  For a 
summary and further reading see, for example Gelfand (1998, ch.12).  For an alternative temporal 
model of pitch perception see Griffiths et al. (1998). 
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The explanation of our experience of the pitch of the sound in the pipe-organ 
illusion thus involves two steps.  The first appeals to the fact that the auditory system 
groups frequency components that are harmonics of a common fundamental; the 
second to the fact that the auditory system treats a set of higher harmonics of a 
missing fundamental in the same way it treats a set of harmonics when the 
fundamental is present.  The two organ pipes produce frequency components which 
are harmonically related – such as would normally be higher harmonics of a missing 
fundamental – and these are treated by the auditory system in the same way it would a 
set in which the missing fundamental was present – a set that could only be produced 
by a much larger pipe – so as to produce an experience of a sound with a pitch the 
same as that of a sound produced by a much larger pipe.  Both parts of this 
explanation appeal to a process which functions to produce experiences which 
represent the source of the sound; a process that also produces an experience of a 
sound with the same pitch as that which would be produced by a source with different 
properties.40 
Because the best explanation of the detection of a partial set of harmonics is 
that they were all produced by a single source, treating a partial set of harmonics as 
harmonics of a single source will normally produce an experience that veridically 
represents the source.  Therefore, in non-ideal circumstances when only a partial set 
of harmonics is detected, the auditory system normally functions to veridically 
represent the source of those harmonics.  In the case of the pipe-organ illusion, the 




40 There’s an assumption in the psychoacoustics literature that the pitch of a sound is identical to its 
fundamental frequency; that we, in some sense, experience this frequency or that this frequency 
produces a sensation of pitch.  That makes it puzzling why – indeed how – a set of harmonics with a 
missing fundamental is experienced as having the same pitch as a set with the fundamental present: in 
the absence of the frequency component, how could we have the experience?  But the assumption (and 
the corresponding puzzle) is just mistaken.  The auditory system is representational; it represents 
sounds as being some way, and the sources of sounds as being some way.  The pitch a sound is 
experienced as having is determined by how the experience of the sound represents that sound to be; 
that is, by what pitch it represents it as having.  What pitch a sound is represented as having may be 
determined by relatively complex properties of the auditory stimulus, and be the result of cognitive 
processing.  We needn’t think that in experiencing a sound we are directly aware of frequency 
components.   Similarly, there is little reason to think that, in representing a sound as having a 
particular pitch, our auditory experience is simply representing the presence of a particular frequency 
component rather than, say, a pattern amongst components that can be instantiated even in the absence 
of a particular component.  A nice example is provided by pitch changes due to the Doppler effect 
which are usually explained by appealing to changes in the frequency of a sound wave.  Whatever you 
might think, the pitch shift cannot be explained that way – it is a cognitive rather than a sensory effect 
(McBeath and Neuhoff 2002). 
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auditory system produces an experience of the source of what would normally 
produce the frequency components it detects. Because these frequency components 
were produced in an abnormal way, the experience produced is not veridical: rather 
than representing what actually produced them, it represents what would normally 
produce those components, namely a single and larger source. 
9. What are sounds? 
 
In the preceding sections I have described how the auditory system groups frequency 
components to produce experiences as of sounds corresponding to their sources, and 
how this grouping process may go wrong and produce experiences as of sounds that 
do not correspond to their sources.  In both cases, the auditory system produces 
experiences that represent sounds.  When are these experiences veridical?  In order to 
answer that question we need to know what, in representing a sound, our auditory 
experience is representing – we need to know what the correctness conditions are for 
experiences of sounds. 
When our auditory system functions normally – that is, when it functions to 
produce experiences that veridically represent the sources of the sounds it represents – 
our experience of sounds depends counterfactually – in the way that I have already 
described – on patterns or structures of frequency components instantiated by the 
soundwave that reaches and is detected by the ears.  It’s in virtue of the frequency 
components of a soundwave instantiating a certain pattern or structure that they can be 
grouped together by the auditory system to produce an experience as of a sound.  
Given this dependence, the following claim is plausible: in representing a sound our 
auditory experience is representing an instance of a pattern or structure – the pattern 
or structure of frequency components that would normally produce an experience of 
that sound.  It follows that an experience as of a sound is veridical only if it is 
produced by the instantiation of pattern or structure of frequency components that 
would normally produce that experience; it is not veridical if either it is not produced 
by any such pattern or if it is produced by a pattern that would not normally produce 
that experience.  
Hallucinatory experiences of sounds are non-veridical in the first way.  A 
hallucinatory experience represents a sound – a pattern instantiated by frequency 
components – that does not exist – the experience is not produced by an instantiation 
 25
of that pattern or indeed any pattern.  Experiences that are non-veridical in the second 
way are most likely to occur as a result of damage to the auditory system.  Lesions 
within the central auditory system can affect our experience of sounds in such a way 
that sounds are experienced as altered in volume, in tone or timbre.41  In such cases, as 
a result of cortical damage, the experience of a sound is produced by the instantiation 
of a pattern of frequency components that would not normally produce that 
experience. 
An experience of a sound can be produced by an instantiated pattern of 
frequency components that would normally produce that experience even when the 
instance of the pattern itself is not produced in the normal way (from the point of view 
of the function of the auditory system).  This happens with most artificially produced 
sounds. Stereo loudspeakers, for example, playing a recording of several objects being 
dropped onto a hard surface, produce a soundwave that instantiates a pattern of 
frequency components that would normally be produced by several objects striking a 
hard surface.  Loudspeakers, from the point of view of the function of the auditory 
system, are an abnormal way of producing such a soundwave.  This abnormally 
produced soundwave instantiates a pattern that nonetheless produces an experience as 
of sounds normally: the experience as of sounds is the same as that such an 
instantiated pattern would normally produce.  It is an experience that represents the 
instantiation of a pattern or structure of frequency components that would normally 
produce an experience of those sounds; it has been produced by such a pattern and so 
is veridical.  Although the experience veridically represents the sounds, because the 
instance of the pattern that produces the experience was not produced normally it 
produces an experience of sounds that do not correspond to their sources.  The 
resultant experience therefore misrepresents the sources of the sounds: it represents 
the sounds as having been produced by sources that did not produce them.   
This is exactly what happens in the pipe-organ illusion.  A soundwave that 
instantiates a pattern of frequency components that would normally be produced by a 
single source is in fact produced by two sources – two different organ pipes.  This 
results in an experience of a single sound that seems to have been produced by a 




41 For a survey of the effects of brain lesions on auditory perception see Griffiths et al. (1999) and 
Griffiths (2002a, b). 
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single source.  To someone who hears the sound there will seem to be a single event 
or object producing it, when in fact there are two.  Although the experience – in virtue 
of being produced by an instantiated pattern of frequency components that would 
normally it – veridically represents the sound, it misrepresents that sound as having 
been produced by a source that didn’t produce it.  The experience misrepresents the 
source of the sound.   
I suggested that we should think of our experience of sounds as representing 
the patterns instantiated by frequency components, on which they counterfactually 
depend.  The frequency components that instantiate such patterns are the proximal 
cause of our auditory experience. It might, therefore, be objected that although in 
general a perceptual representation counterfactually depends on its proximal cause, it 
doesn’t follow that it represents that proximal cause.  Our visual experience, for 
example, counterfactually depends on its proximal cause – patterns of light detected 
by the retina – but it would be a mistake to think it represents those patterns.  In 
claiming that our auditory experience as of a sound represents an instance of a pattern 
or structure of frequency components aren’t I mistakenly assuming that an auditory 
experience represents its proximal cause?  In fact, since the medium through which 
soundwaves travel simply transmits vibrations, it might seem reasonable to suppose 
that when our auditory system functions normally and our experience of the source of 
the sound is veridical, whatever patterns of frequency components are instantiated by 
the soundwave that reaches the ear will be (or will have been) instantiated by the 
objects whose vibration produced the soundwave.   In these cases our experience of 
sounds depends counterfactually on frequency components instantiated by the source 
of the sound, so isn’t it more plausible to claim that our experience of sounds 
represents patterns instantiated by the sources of sounds, rather than by soundwaves?  
It would follow that sounds are instantiated by the objects that produce them.  In that 
case our experience of sounds will be veridical just in case our experience of the 
source of the sound is, and if our experience misrepresents the source of a sound it 
must misrepresent the sound. 
According to the objection, the fact that our experience of sounds depends on 
the pattern of frequency components instantiated by the soundwave just tells us what 
causes our experiences of sounds, it doesn’t tell us what those experiences represent 
and so it doesn’t tell us when the experiences are veridical.  So what justifies the 
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move from the claim about what determines our experiences of sounds to the claim 
about what sounds we experience? 
The auditory system function that I have characterised describes the 
relationship between three things: objects and events involving objects; the objects’ 
vibrations (which can be characterised as a set of frequency components instantiated 
by the object); and the vibrations of the soundwave (which can be characterised as a 
set of frequency components instantiated by the soundwave).  According to my 
characterisation, the auditory system functions to extract information about objects 
and events from properties of the soundwaves that it detects.  It detects and groups the 
frequency components of the soundwave that reaches the ears, from which it extracts 
information about the object and the events that caused the object to vibrate.  The 
frequency component groupings function to track or represent properties of the 
soundwave from which information about the source is extracted. 
One might question the claim that the grouping of frequency components 
functions to track properties of the soundwave that reaches the ears rather than 
properties of the objects that produced the soundwaves.  That would suggest an 
alternative characterisation of the function of the auditory system: it functions to 
extract information about the ways in which objects vibrate from the soundwaves it 
detects.  It detects and groups the frequency components of the soundwaves that reach 
the ears on the basis of which it forms a representation of objects’ vibrations from 
which information is extracted about the objects and the events that caused them to 
vibrate.  The frequency component groupings function to represent the source objects’ 
vibrations – the distal vibrations – from which information about the source is 
extracted.  In both cases the end result is the same – information about objects is 
extracted – and in both cases our experience of sounds is determined by the way 
detected frequency components are grouped, but the two characterisations differ in 
what they imply about the connection between our experience of sounds and the 
sounds of which they are experiences.   
If the frequency component groupings function to track objects’ vibrations – 
the distal vibrations – then it is plausible that the sounds that our experience 
represents supervene on objects’ vibrations.  In that case, although our experiences of 
sounds would be determined by a proximal cause – the vibration of the soundwave 
that reaches the ears – what they represent would be determined by their distal cause 
– the vibrations of objects.  If, on the other hand, the grouping of frequency 
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components doesn’t function to track objects’ vibrations but vibrations of the 
soundwave detected by the ears, then there would be no grounds for claiming that the 
experiences of sounds determined by such groupings represent vibrations of objects.  
In that case, the sounds our experience represents supervene on properties of the 
soundwave and both our experiences of sounds and what our experiences represent 
would be determined by the more proximal cause.  The correct characterisation of the 
function of grouping therefore matters for what we say about sounds. 
How should we understand the function of grouping – as a process that 
attempts to tell us about distal vibrations of objects or as a process that simply tells us 
about the vibrations of the soundwave?  Grouping processes operate on the initial 
sensory representations in the auditory system.  These representations are produced as 
a result of the soundwave stimulating different areas of the basilar membrane to 
produce a frequency dependent excitation of nerves whose frequency dependent 
structure is preserved in tonotopically organised areas of the auditory cortex.  These 
representations are like a spectrogram of the soundwave, encoding information about 
the intensity, frequency, and time course of its vibration: they represent (in the sense 
of embodying information about) frequency components of the soundwave.  Grouping 
processes operate on these representations with the result that subsequent processes 
treat various represented components as belonging together.  We shouldn’t think of a 
grouping as a functioning to produce distinct representations of groups of frequency 
components.  To say that components are grouped is simply to say that subsequent 
processes treat represented frequency components as a group.42 
Should we think of groupings as representations of the distal vibration?  Is 
grouping components together sufficient for those groups to function as 
representations of the distal cause?  Since grouping treats together only those 
components that are likely to have been produced by the same object, groups of 
components will normally match components of the object’s vibration; a consequence 
of grouping, therefore, is that a group of frequency components normally matches or 
corresponds to their distal cause – the vibration of an object.  However, it doesn’t 
follow from the normal correspondence of groupings with object vibrations that 




42 I am using the term ‘grouped’ are the name of a process, not the product of a process.  
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grouping is functioning to track objects’ vibrations rather than vibrations of the 
soundwave: the mere fact of correspondence isn’t sufficient for groupings to represent 
distal vibrations.   
If detected frequency components are grouped because they are all part of the 
same distal vibration – because they co-occur distally – then we would have a reason 
to say that grouping functions to track the distal vibration.  But frequency components 
are not grouped because they co-occur distally; they are grouped because they are 
produced by a single object and carry information about that object.  Although it is a 
consequence of being produced by a single object that frequency components co-
occur distally, that doesn’t make distal co-occurrence itself explanatory of grouping.  
An explanation of why the auditory system groups harmonics that appeals simply to 
the fact that harmonics normally co-occur, for example, wouldn’t tell us why 
harmonics normally co-occur or why their co-occurrence matters to the auditory 
system.  Grouping is a process that treats components together because they are likely 
to have been produced by the same object and carry information about that object, and 
not because they are likely to have co-occurred: frequency components are not 
grouped by the auditory system because they are part of the same distal vibration. 
The alternative characterisation of the function of the auditory system is 
therefore mistaken.  We shouldn’t think of grouping as an attempt to recover the distal 
vibration from the proximal vibration, and we cannot understand the function of the 
auditory system in terms of the distal vibration and without reference to the source 
object.  The auditory system does not function to tell us about the way objects are 
vibrating.  It uses the fact that the way an object vibrates carries information about the 
object and structures a soundwave to enable us to perceive that object and its 
properties.  Information about the object can be extracted directly from properties of 
the soundwave by a process that involves auditory grouping, no part of which requires 
the auditory system to represent how the object is actually vibrating.  Since 
information about the object can be extracted directly from the soundwave, it would 
be functionally pointless for the auditory system to use the way a soundwave vibrates 
as a guide to how the object that produced it vibrates only then to extract information 
about the object from that vibration.  Thus our experience of sounds depends 
functionally on patterns instantiated by the soundwave rather than by the source of the 
sound, and it is implausible to think that the experience of sounds represents patterns 
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instantiated by the source, rather than patterns instantiated by the soundwave which 
may sometimes also be instantiated by the source. 
Our experience of sounds contrasts with our visual experience of objects and 
their properties in a significant respect.  Visual experience represents the surface 
reflectance of objects – the perceived lightness of an object’s surface.  The amount of 
light that is reflected by the surface of an object depends on both the level of 
illumination of the surface and its reflectance. A light surface dimly illuminated can 
reflect the same light that a brightly illuminated dark surface reflects; since the dark 
surface can still be perceived as darker than the light surface, the lightness of an 
object is not determined directly from the proximal stimulus – the intensity of light 
that reaches the eyes.  In order to accurately represent the object’s surface reflectance 
property the visual system must compensate for changes in illumination.43 
Although the auditory system functions to correctly represent other properties 
of objects, it doesn’t function to correctly represent objects’ vibrations.  A good 
example is provided by loudness.  How loud a sound is experienced to be is 
(approximately) determined by the amplitude of its associated frequency 
components.44  The amplitude of the frequency components of the soundwave 
detected by the ears is determined by the amplitude of the object’s vibration together 
with the distance of the object from the perceiver (amplitude decreases with distance).  
If the auditory system were functioning to represent the object’s vibration then we 
would expect it to compensate for the distance of the object from the perceiver; only 
then would it correctly represent the amplitude of the object’s vibration.  It doesn’t do 
so.  The loudness of the sounds we hear is determined by the amplitude of the 
soundwave that affects the ears and not by the amplitude of the vibration of the object 
that produced the soundwave.  Two objects vibrating at different amplitudes produce 
sounds which are experienced as equally loud for as long as the objects are at different 
distances from the perceiver.  There is no auditory equivalent to the lightness 




43 Despite over a century of sustained investigation, how the perceptual system does this is not fully 
understood.  For an excellent survey and discussion see Gilchrist 2006. 
44 How loud a sound is experienced to be should be distinguished from how forceful or violent the 
event that produced the sound is experienced to be.  Changing the apparent loudness of the sound made 
by a stick striking a drum doesn’t change how hard – with what force – the stick is heard to strike the 
drum. 
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constancy processes in vision.45  This further supports my suggestion that our 
experience of sounds represents patterns instantiated by the soundwave rather than by 
objects. 
The conclusion that our experiences of sounds can be veridical even when 
those sounds don’t correspond to their sources seems better to capture our intuitions 
about the veridicality of our experience than the alternative.  When we have an 
experience of sounds produced by loudspeakers, for example, we have an experience 
of sounds that don’t correspond to their sources.  According to the objection, such an 
experience misrepresents something as instantiating a pattern of frequency 
components: it misrepresents an object as instantiating the sound, when no such object 
exists.  According to the objection, then, loudspeakers produce experiences of merely 
apparent sounds – of sounds that don’t exist.  That strikes me as a very 
counterintuitive conclusion, one that threatens the veridicality of many of our 
everyday auditory experiences. 
Many of the everyday sounds we experience have been distorted or changed in 
some way during their transmission.  The sounds of cars passing outside, for example, 
or of a voice from next door, are altered during their transmission through the 
structure of the building.  Various frequency components of the soundwaves these 
objects produce are filtered or altered, so that the sounds we experience sound 
different to the way they would have sounded had they not been filtered.  Since the 
pattern of frequency components instantiated by the soundwave that produces these 
experiences is different to that instantiated by the sources the sounds, any account of 
sounds that identifies them with properties of their sources would have to say that 
these experiences of sounds are not veridical.46  On such an account many, if not 




45 For this reason, my argument that sounds supervene on the proximal cause of our experiences of 
sounds doesn’t carry over to the case of colours: my argument does not have the implication that 
colours supervene on properties of the light that affects the eyes. 
46 Robert Pasnau has argued that any account, such as mine, according to which sounds supervene on 
soundwaves is incompatible with viewing our auditory experience as generally veridical on the grounds 
that we hear sounds ‘as being at the place where they are generated’ (1999, p.311).  On my view it is 
the sources of sounds that we hear as located, not the sounds they produce.  Pasnau’s examples of 
hearing the location of sounds are for the most part examples of hearing the location of the sources of 
sounds.  He rejects the suggestion that we hear the location the sources of sounds in virtue of hearing 
sounds that are spatially distinct from them as ‘odd’ on the grounds that it makes hearing ‘indirect in 
the most unlikely way’ (p.318).  It follows from my account of the relation between sounds and their 
 32
most, of our normally produced auditory experiences turn out to be non-veridical.  
Such a consequence is usually thought to be a decisive reason for rejecting any 
putative account of perception. 
I’ve said something about the correctness conditions for an experience of a 
sound.   An account of the correctness conditions of our experience of sounds doesn’t 
settle all questions about their identity conditions.  This focus of this paper is auditory 
perception rather than sounds themselves – a detailed discussion of sounds is a topic 
for another paper – but a few brief remarks are in order.  I have argued that an 
experience of a sound represents a pattern or structure instantiated by a soundwave.  
Does that mean we should identify particular sounds with instantiations of a type of 
pattern or structure? 
Our normal ways of individuating sounds allows that two people, in different – 
even very distant – places, can hear the same particular sound – you and I both hear 
the same sound when we hear the sound of a gunshot.  To deny this would be to allow 
that a single event – a gunshot, say – produces more than one sound: a sound heard by 
me, and a sound heard by you at a distance.  Since people at different places who hear 
the same sound are not – or need not be – affected by the same instantiation of 
frequency components we cannot identify particular sounds with instances of a 
pattern or structural type.  Similarly, our normal ways of individuating sounds allows 
that two people hear the same sound even if they hear it as having different qualities.  
The sound of a gunshot heard close by may be different – louder, sharper – to that 
same sound heard at a distance; it is, nonetheless, the same sound.  But again, since 
the instantiation of frequency components must be different in the two cases, and may 
even be an instance of a different pattern, the sound cannot be identical to an instance 
of a pattern type. 
If sounds are not identical to instances of pattern types, then could they be the 
pattern types themselves?  Our normal way of individuating them treats sounds as 
particular things such that we can allow that two sounds may be qualitatively the same 
– the same type of sound – and yet be distinct individual sounds.  Two sounds that are 
indistinguishable, for example, are usually counted as distinct if they are produced by 




sources that sounds are not always located at their sources and that our auditory experience is generally 
veridical.  I discuss the spatial content of auditory experience in more detail in (****). 
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different sources.  Thinking of sounds as pattern types doesn’t allow us to make this 
distinction.  Furthermore, if sounds are things that come into being when they are 
produced then for any sound there is a time before which it did not exist, a time at 
which it came into existence and, presumably, a time at which it will cease to exist; 
although instances of pattern types have these temporal properties, pattern types 
themselves do not.   
Any account of sounds should, as far as possible, accommodate our normal 
ways of individuating sounds.  The ontological category that comes closest to doing 
so is that of particularized types or abstract individuals: to view sounds as abstract 
individuals would be to view them as belonging to the same ontological category as 
symphonies and other multiply instantiated art works, or to the same category as 
words (on Kaplan’s account of the ontology of words).47  To claim that sounds are 
abstract individuals is not, of course, to deny that sounds are instantiated by 
soundwaves any more than to claim that words are abstract individuals is to deny that 
words are instantiated by, for example, patterns of ink on paper.  It simply allows the 
possibility that a sound, like a word, may be instantiated at more than one place and 
time. 
Viewing sounds as abstract individuals is consistent with the plausible view 
that a recording of a sound, when played, can reproduce the very same sound as was 
originally recorded, so that, in hearing a recording, we hear the very same sound 
again.  It is in virtue of that, I suggest, that in hearing a recording of Winston 
Churchill’s voice we hear Winston Churchill; it explains, too, the sense we have that 
hearing a recording of a person brings us into closer contact with them than seeing a 








47 This idea that sounds are abstract individuals was suggested to me by Mike Martin.  For Kaplan’s 
account of the ontology of words, see Kaplan (1990). 
48 But see Walton’s discussion of the transparency of photographs in Walton (1984). 
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I have argued that our experiences of sounds are produced by a process whose 
function is to produce experiences of sounds that correspond to their sources: when it 
is successful, the sounds we experience correspond to their sources; when it is not 
successful, we experience sounds that do not correspond to their sources.   
The principles that determine how the auditory system groups frequency 
components to produce experiences of distinct sounds – and so which explain why we 
hear the sounds we hear – can only be understood relative to the auditory system’s 
function.  We cannot give any account or explanation of what sounds are 
independently of such a process.  The account I have given of the function of auditory 
perception has the consequence, therefore, that it is not possible to say what sounds 
are instantiated by a soundwave independently of the auditory system’s capacity to 
detect them.  In that sense, what sounds there are depends on what sounds we would 
experience there to be.  Sounds are perception dependent.   
Being perception dependent in this way does not mean being subjective.  The 
claim that we cannot give any account of sounds independently of our capacity to 
perceive them does not imply that individual sounds are experience or mind-
dependent, or otherwise subjective.  I am not, for example, claiming that sounds are 
mental objects, that they are analogous to visual sense data.  Visual sense data, as they 
are usually conceived, are mind-dependent objects of experience: it is supposed that 
having an experience as of an object is sufficient for the existence of an object – a 
sense datum – of which one is aware.  Nothing in my account entails that having an 
experience of a sound is sufficient for the existence of that sound.   
On my view, our experience of sounds represents the existence of an 
instantiated pattern or structure of frequency components and so has correctness 
conditions – we can make sense of the experience being veridical or non-veridical.  
Sounds are patterns or structures instantiated by soundwaves, and the instantiation of 
a pattern or structure by a soundwave is a perfectly objective – subject independent – 
matter.  The fact that a soundwave instantiates a particular sound, therefore, is a fact 
about the soundwave that obtains independently of anyone having an experience of 
the sound, and having an experience as of a sound is not sufficient for that sound to 
exist.  Which of the patterns of frequency components instantiated by a soundwave 
are sounds, however, is determined by how the auditory system would group those 
components.  What sounds are instantiated by a soundwave therefore depends on the 
capacity of the auditory system to perceive them. 
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I began by describing the common view of auditory perception as the view 
that auditory perception functions to tell us about sounds and their properties.  Whilst 
there’s a perfectly good sense in which my account is an account of the perception of 
sounds and their properties, my account differs from the common view in two 
important respects.  First, what sounds there are is perception dependent in the way I 
have just described.  Second, our capacity to perceive sounds is part of a perceptual 
process whose function is to perceive the sources of sounds.  The capacity to perceive 
sounds depends on the capacity to perceive the sources of sounds and not, as the 
common view has it, the other way around. 
From an evolutionary point of view it makes good sense that auditory 
experience should represent the sources of sounds since it is the sources of sounds, 
rather than the sounds themselves, that have an impact on our survival and prosperity.  
Sounds, in contrast, are causally insignificant.  It is puzzling, then, why we are aware 
of sounds as well as their sources: it is difficult to imagine what evolutionary 
advantage an awareness of sounds could confer on an animal that was already capable 
of perceiving the sources of sounds.  It is a puzzle to which I don’t have a solution.49  
11. Content of auditory experience 
The auditory system functions to represent sounds that correspond to their sources (to 
the objects and events that produced them) as part of a process that extracts 
information about those sources.  As a result our experience represents both sounds 
and the sources of sounds, and we normally experience sounds that correspond to 
their sources.   
How do we experience the connection between the sounds we experience and 
the sources of those sounds?  When we have an experience of a sound and its source 
we are not independently aware of two objects as we are, for example, when we have 
a visual experience of two marks on a piece of paper.  In the visual case we could – by 
covering one of the marks or shifting our attention – be aware of either mark without 
being aware of the other.  This isn’t true of our awareness of a sound and its source.  




49 One might speculate that an awareness of sounds rather than their sources plays an essential role in 
communication and it is this which conveys evolutionary advantage; though the implausibility of 
psychoacoustic accounts of speech perception over motor or direct-perception accounts of speech 
perception might suggest otherwise.  See Massaro 1998, and Liberman, 1996. 
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We don’t experience the source of a sound independently of experiencing the sound 
that it produces.  When we experience a sound we experience it as apparently having 
been produced a source of a certain kind.  For example, in experiencing the sound 
produced by a solid object falling onto a hard surface we experience a sound as 
apparently having been produced by a solid object falling onto a hard surface; in 
experiencing the sound made by a bird singing outside the window we experience a 
sound as apparently coming from outside.  Normally, when we hear a sound we hear 
it as having been produced by a source; in virtue of that we can hear the source.  That 
we hear sounds as produced by their sources is reflected in the way we describe 
sounds: we talk of the sound of a dropped ball and of a bird singing.  Describing a 
sound as the sound of something can be naturally understood to mean the sound made 
by or produced by that thing. 
It is important to distinguish between the claim that we hear sounds as 
appearing to have the property of being produced by a source and the claim that we 
hear sounds as having the property of appearing to have been produced by a source.  
We can describe the character of a sound – the way the sound appears to us – in terms 
of its intrinsic auditory qualities of pitch, timbre, and so on.  We cannot describe our 
experience of a sound as apparently having been produced by a source of a certain 
kind simply in terms of those auditory qualities of the sound that determine how that 
sound appears.  This is clear in the case of our experience of the apparent location of 
the source of a sound.  Two sounds that are otherwise indistinguishable can seem to 
come from sources located at different places; in hearing these two sounds we hear 
them as having been produced by sources with different (spatial) properties without 
hearing any difference in the auditory qualities of the sounds.  In general, hearing a 
sound as seeming to have a source of a certain kind is not a matter of hearing it as 
having certain auditory qualities.   Therefore, hearing a sound as produced by a source 
is not simply a matter of hearing a sound as appearing some way – as having certain 
intrinsic properties.50   




50 The suggestion that sounds appear to have certain sources might seem plausible given that frequency 
component groupings both carry information about what produced them and determine what sounds we 
hear: we might be tempted to identify sounds with frequency component groupings and so think of 
sounds as themselves bearers of information.  To do so would be mistaken.  Whilst it is true that 
information is carried by soundwaves, it is extracted by the auditory system as part of the process that 
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Sounds are produced by sources.  A sound has the property of having been 
produced by a source of a certain kind.  When we experience a sound as having been 
produced by a source, our experience represents it as having that non-intrinsic 
property.  Therefore, our auditory experience represents sounds and the sources of 
sounds and it represents sources as the sources of sounds by representing sounds as 
having a non-intrinsic property – the property of having been produced by a source of 
a certain kind.  We can perceive sounds as having been produced by their sources in 
virtue of our experience (veridically) representing them as having been so produced.  
As well as offering the best explanation of our experience of sounds and their sources, 
this description is consistent with the fact that our auditory system functions to extract 
information about the objects and events that produce the soundwaves it detects.   
Auditory experience represents sounds as apparently produced by a source of a 
certain kind, that is, with certain properties; for the experience to be veridical the 
sound must have actually been produced by a source of that kind.  This has the 
implication that our experience of sounds normally commits us to the existence of 
something other than sounds.  That is surely right.  Suppose that you hear the sound of 
a drum apparently being played in middle of the room.  Your experience tells you that 
there is something happening there, that an event of a certain sort – the playing of a 
drum – is occurring.  If there is no drum there, your experience has misled you.  The 
experience wouldn’t be veridical even if we contrived – using an array of speakers, 
for example – to reproduce exactly the sounds that a drum being played there would 
make.  An experience produced in this way would be no more veridical than would be 
the visual experience of a perfect hologram of a vase on a table in front of you.  A 
visual experience produced by a perfect hologram does not represent the world as it 
really is: it represents the existence of an object – a vase – that doesn’t exist.  
Similarly, an auditory experience of a drum playing represents the existence an object; 
if there is no object being played there then your experience has misled you.   
It is because our auditory experience of sounds commits us to the existence of 
objects other than sounds that surround-sound systems in the cinema are so effective.  




produces our experiences of sounds and their sources, we are not aware of the relationships amongst 
frequency components in virtue of which they carry information and we don’t experience sounds as 
having features that indicate what produced them.   
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Such systems use sounds to create the illusion of objects moving or being located 
around the listener.  When you hear such sounds it seems as if objects really are 
moving past and around you.  Knowing that the experiences are not veridical does not 
alter the effect: knowing that there are in reality no objects flying past does not 
prevent it seeming as if there are objects flying past.  That it seems that there are 
objects flying past when we know that there aren’t indicates that the illusion is 
perceptual and not the result of a judgment made on the basis of the experience.51 
The claim that auditory experience represents sounds as having been produced 
by their sources might seem puzzling: the sources of sounds are objects – how can 
auditory experience represent objects?  It can seem puzzling if we think that 
perceptual experience is restricted in what properties it can represent to those 
properties that determine how things perceptually appear.52  Since having the property 
of being produced by a source of a certain kind is not a matter of a sound’s having a 
certain appearance, how does our experience represent it as having that property?  
And since nothing other than sounds can auditorily appear to us, how can our auditory 
experience represent anything other than sounds?  In particular, how can it represent 
the objects that are the sources of sounds?   
If we think that perceptual experience is restricted in this way then our visual 
experience of objects can seem similarly puzzling.  We see solid objects as solid 
objects and not just as the facing surfaces of solid objects, but how can visual 
experience represent something as actually being, say, cubic – as something with a 
rear surface – rather than merely having the appearance of being cubic – as a surface 
with the same appearance as that of a cube?53  We see tomatoes as tomatoes and not 
simply as objects having a tomato-like appearance,54 but how can visual experience 
represent something as having more than the appearance of a tomato – as having a 




51 The illusion shows the immunity to judgment that is characteristic of is the content of an experience 
as opposed to the content of judgement. 
52 There are two conceptions of appearance that are relevant here.  Something can appear F if, taking 
our experience at face value, we would judge that it is F or something can appear F if it has the sensory 
quality of F-ness.  Sometimes talk of appearance is shorthand for how someone would judge something 
to be; sometimes it stands for ‘sensory’ appearance.  In the following discussion I mean it in the second 
sense. 
53 Since a solid cube can be visually indistinguishable from the facing surface of a cube – a cube from 
which every part not visible from the subject’s point of view have been removed – having a rear 
surface and not being hollow are not properties that contribute to the appearance of a solid cube 
54 At least it is arguable that we do 
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certain colour, shape, and so on – how can it represent it as having whatever property 
it is (presumably a certain genetic structure) that determines whether something is a 
tomato?  In representing something as cubic our visual experience represents it as 
having properties that go beyond the properties that actually determine how it appears.  
In representing something as a tomato our visual experience represents it as having 
properties that go beyond those that could determine how it appears. 
Peacocke (1993, p.169) has claimed, surely correctly, that we experience 
objects as specifically material objects: a visual experience of a boulder in front of 
you produced by a perfect hologram of a boulder does not represent the world as it 
actually is, even if the hologram is visually indistinguishable from a real boulder.  The 
content of the experience goes beyond the representation of the boulder’s appearance 
– it represents the boulder as a material object; that is, as having the properties and 
causal powers that are essential to something’s being a material object.  Peacocke 
suggests that we can explain how someone can have a perceptual representation of a 
material object by supposing that their experience serves as input to a (perhaps only 
implicitly known) theory – an intuitive mechanics – whose theorems give content to 
their concept of a material object. 
Whether or not we accept the details of Peacocke’s account, he is certainly 
right about two things.  First, that visual experience represents objects as having 
properties that are not properties that determine how the object visually appears; and 
second, that an explanation of how visual experience can have such content will 
appeal to more general capacities of the subject – such as an intuitive understanding 
of mechanics – that are not perceptual capacities.  What is true of visual experience is 
also true of auditory experience, and whatever explanation we give of how visual 
experience can have content that represents material objects will also apply to 
auditory experience.  Therefore, the claim that auditory experience represents sounds 
as having been produced by their sources is no more puzzling or problematic – and so 
no more objectionable – than the claim that visual experience represents objects as 
material objects.   
Although a similar explanation can be given both of how visual experience 
and auditory experience represents objects, visual and auditory experiences do not 
represent objects in exactly the same way.  For example, in seeing a bowling ball 
rolling down a bowling lane we normally see it as having a range of properties: we 
see its colour, its shape and size, its location relative to other objects, the surface on 
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which it rolls, and so on.  We see these properties of the ball and its surroundings in 
virtue of our visual experience representing them.  In hearing a bowling ball rolling 
down a bowling lane it is possible to hear it as such; in doing so we have an auditory 
experience as of an object rolling along a hard and smooth surface, an experience that 
wouldn’t be veridical if it wasn’t produced by an object rolling on a hard surface.  If 
we took this experience at face value we would judge that there is an object rolling on 
a hard surface.  But when we hear a ball as rolling our experience represents far less 
about the ball and its surroundings than the visual experience, and what it does 
represent it may represent in a way that is less determinate than the way visual 
experience would.   
When we visually experience a ball as rolling the ball looks or appears 
spherical – the experience represents the ball as spherical.  When we have an auditory 
experience of a ball as rolling the ball doesn’t appear spherical.  The auditory system 
is simply not capable of detecting the geometrical properties of objects with any 
precision; therefore, in representing a ball as rolling our auditory experience does not 
represent it as having a determinate shape – as being spherical rather than cylindrical, 
for example.  But having a shape is not simply a matter of having a certain 
appearance: the shape of an object has implications for how it will behave in its 
interactions with other objects – it helps to determine the object’s causal powers.55  
Although the auditory system cannot detect geometrical properties with any precision 
it can detect the casual interactions of objects including, for example, that an object is 
rolling on a hard surface.  So although auditory experience may not represent objects 
as having a geometrical shape, it may represent them as having the causal properties 
that govern their interactions with other objects.  A ball rolls in virtue of being 
spherical.  In hearing a ball as rolling our auditory experience doesn’t represent it as 
spherical but as having a causal property: the property shared by all objects that have 
a tendency to roll.  That property is a determinable whose determinates are the shapes 
– cylindrical, spherical, and so on – that enable objects to roll.   
Something similar is plausibly true of visual experience.  In representing an 
object as having a shape, our visual experience does not simply represent it as having 




55 See Campbell 2005, pp.216 ff.  This paragraph and the next draw on Campbell’s discussion of the 
relations between tactile and visual perception of shape. 
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a certain appearance, but as having a causal property that partly determines its 
interactions with other objects.  When we visually perceive the shape of an object we 
perceive its causal significance: in seeing an object as spherical we see it as having a 
tendency to roll.  If that’s right, then we can think of both auditory and visual 
perception as capable of representing the causal powers an object has in virtue of 
having the shape it has – we can both hear and see that an object has a tendency to roll 
– but only in the case of vision do we also experience the object as having a 
geometrical appearance. 
Although the examples I have described show that our auditory experience can 
represent a sound as having been produced by an object, it does not follow that our 
auditory experience always represents a sound as having been produced by an object, 
and although the examples I have describe suggest that our auditory experience can 
represent the sources of sounds as having a variety of different properties, it doesn’t 
follow that it always represents them as having such properties.  Although an 
experience may represent the location of the source of a sound, for example, we have 
experiences which don’t do so: we sometimes hear a sound and cannot tell where it 
comes from.  This is another way in which auditory experience differs from visual 
experience.  Normally, when one sees something one experiences it as being 
determinately some way for every way it is possible to visually experience something 
to be.  It would be unusual or abnormal to have a visual experience of an object that 
didn’t represent it as being coloured, of a certain size and shape, at a certain location, 
and so on.  The same is not true of auditory experiences.  Our auditory experience of 
the source of a sound may be in many respects indeterminate and tell us little about 
the nature of the source. 
If experience represents sounds as having been produced by their sources it 
must represent causal relations.  We are familiar with experiences of seeing one event 
cause another, as Peacocke says: 
  
anyone who sees the child’s hand knocking over the tower of blocks, or 
a fork-lift truck as lifting a crate, has [experiences as of one event 
causing another].  These experiences would not be adequately 
characterised as seeing an event of one type following an event of 
another type.  Rather, taking the experiences at face value, one would be 
disposed to judge that the child’s movement caused the tower to fall 
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over or to judge that rising of the fork-lift truck’s arms caused the crate 
to go up (1986, p.156). 
  
In these examples, apparent causation between two events is visually perceived.  I am 
suggesting that, just as visual experience can represent a causal relation between two 
objects, so auditory experience can represent a causal relation between a sound the 
thing that produced it.  Of course, auditory experience doesn’t represent a causal 
relation between two objects, but between an object and a sound; nonetheless, in 
experiencing a sound as produced by a source, our experience is representing an 
instance of a relation of the same kind as our visual experience represents in the cases 
Peacocke describes.  Thus, taking an experience of hearing the sound of a dog’s bark 
at face value, one would be disposed to judge that a dog is responsible for the sound 
that one hears, that the dog’s barking is causing or producing that sound.56 
Someone might still object to my description of these experiences as 
experiences as of causation for the reason that we can never have such experiences.57  
Our concept of causation, it might be argued, is the concept of a kind of relation 
which we could not simply perceive to be instantiated.  Peter Menzies, for example, 
suggests that the counterfactuals involved in an instance of causation make it a 
relation that ‘cannot plausibly be claimed to be an object of direct awareness’ on the 
grounds that the truth of a counterfactual cannot be perceived (1993, pp. 202-3).  The 
concept of a cause to which I am appealing, however, is one of a whole range of 
causal concepts that feature in our everyday thought and language, concepts which 




56 Of course, I am not suggesting that the circumstances in which in the auditory system represents two 
objects as causally related are the same as those in which the visual system represents sounds and their 
sources as casually related.  For the claim with respect to vision, see Michotte (1963, esp. appendix 2); 
and see Bruce and Green (1990, p.333) for a discussion and other references.  Bruce and Green are 
sceptical of Michotte’s claim that causality is directly perceived, but not of the claim that we do have 
experiences of the sort described by Michotte.  It’s just that they think that an explanation of our 
experience’s representing causality must appeal to computations or inferences performed by the visual 
system.   
57 In his account of the content of visual experience John Searle (1983, ch.2) argued that the content of 
a visual experience of a truck is veridical only if the experience is caused by the truck.  His argument 
has been widely criticized on the grounds that it is implausible to think experience represents such a 
causal relation.  What is implausible about Searle’s view is not the claim that visual experience 
represents a causal relation, but that it represents a reflexive causal relation between the object of an 
experience and the experience of that object.  The causal relation I claim to be represented in auditory 
experience is between objects – sounds and their sources – not objects and experiences, and so is not 
similarly implausible. 
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include: scrape, push, carry, knock over, squash, make and so on,58 and not that 
provided by philosophical analysis.  We should view a philosophical analysis of 
causation as giving an account the relation to which the everyday concept refers and 
not an account of the basis on which we apply the everyday concept.  For as long as 
we allow that people possess and use such everyday causal concepts, and can apply 
them to things on the basis of perceiving the interactions between objects or, as in the 
case of auditory experience, on the basis of experiencing of sounds and their sources, 
then we should allow that causality, in this sense, can be perceived.  People do 
possess and use such concepts; Anscombe is undoubtedly right when she says that 
 
as surely as we learned to call people by name or to report from seeing it 
that the cat was on the table, we also learned to report from having 
observed it that someone drank up the milk or that the dog made a funny 
noise or that things were cut or broken by whatever we saw cut or break 
them (1971, p.69). 
 
In claiming that our auditory experience represents sounds as produced by their 
sources I am claiming no more than that our experience represents a relation such as 
these.59 
Claiming that we experience sounds as produced by their sources might seem 
to go against those who claim that a pure sound world is conceivable.60  In fact, it 
does not do so.  My claim is not that sounds themselves require or entail the existence 
of something other than sounds – that sounds have the intrinsic property of having 
been produced by something – but that our experience – by representing sounds as 
produced by something represents sounds as related to something other than sounds.  
So although our auditory experience, if it is to be veridical, requires the existence of 
things other than sounds, there is nothing prima facie incoherent in the idea of a pure 




58 This list is from Anscombe (1971, pp. 68-9). 
59 Anscombe points out that the apparent perception of such things may only be apparent: we may be 
deceived by false appearances.  It should be noted, too, that we can accept that we have such 
experiences of causation without committing ourselves to any particular account of the nature of 
causation in the world (c.f. Peacocke 1986, p.156).  
60 Famously Strawson (1959, ch.2); see also Scruton (1997, ch.1). 
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sound world, a world of sounds that were not produced by sources.  (Perhaps a 
powerful deity could simply bring about soundwaves that instantiate patterns of 
frequency components.)  If a pure sound world is conceivable, it involves conceiving 
of sounds as unheard, as existing independently of our experience of them. 
12. Conclusion 
I began by describing the pipe-organ illusion and asking in what way the experience 
produced by it is illusory.  It follows from the account I have given of the function of 
the auditory system that the experience misleads us about the source of the sound we 
hear.  In hearing the sound produced by the pipe-organ illusion, we have an 
experience of a sound that seems to have been produced by something that did not in 
fact produce it.  Although our experience of the sound is veridical – there really is a 
sound that we hear and it is the way we hear it to be – our experience of the source is 
not.  There are other auditory illusions and strange auditory phenomena that I have not 
had space to discuss.61  Many of them occur as a consequence of the fact that we can 
artificially manipulate frequency components to produce sounds in an abnormal way 
(from the point of view of the auditory system) – in a way that they could never 
naturally be produced.  All such illusions can be accommodated within the account 
that I have given.  The pattern of explanation of these auditory illusions is perhaps 
unique to audition; they occur as a result of the fact that we perceive the sources of 
sounds by perceiving the sounds they produce.  In that sense our auditory experience 
is mediated or indirect. 
I have not had space to discuss alternative views of the nature of sounds, but 
the account I have given is inconsistent with a number of recent accounts.  Those 
accounts have all argued, in one way or another, that sounds are properties of or 
events involving their sources.62  They have done so on the grounds that we 
experience sounds as being located at their sources.  On my account, sounds are 
distinct from their sources and – as the pipe-organ illusion shows – may not in fact be 
produced by a single source; on my account it is the sources of sounds that we 




61 Some of these are available on Diana Deutsch’s CDs ‘Musical Illusions and Paradoxes’ and 
‘Phantom Words and Other Curiosities’. 
62 See Casati and Dokic (1994), Pasnau (1999), and O’Callaghan (2005). 
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experience to be located rather than the sounds that they produce.  These alternative 
accounts all share the assumption that auditory perception functions in the same way 
as visual perception; it differs only in enabling the perception of sounds.  One of my 
aims has been to show that auditory perception is different to visual perception and 
that an account of sounds cannot be given independently of an account of auditory 
perception. 
Many further questions remain – about speech and music perception; about 
sound and sound-source recognition; about the detailed content, especially the spatial 
content, of auditory experience; and about the connections between auditory and 
visual experience.  By giving an account of the function of auditory perception and of 
the content of auditory experience I hope to have provided a framework within which 
these questions may fruitfully be addressed. 
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